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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
IN RE ENDOCHOICE HOLDINGS, INC. 
SECUR1TIES LITIGATION 
) 
) Civil Action File No. 2016CV277772 
) 
) (Consolidated with Civil Action No. 
) 2016cv281193) 
) 
) CLASS ACTION 
) 
ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
Before this Court is a Corrected Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Consolidated Complaint by 
EndoChoice Defendants and also Underwriter Defendants' separate Motion to Dismiss the 
Consolidated Class Action Complaint. Having considered the briefs submitted and oral 
arguments, the Court finds as follows: 
EndoChoice Holdings, Inc. ("EndoChoice"), a medical device company, offers products 
such as colonoscopes used by gastrointestinal caregivers. In 2015, EndoChoice sought funding 
through an Initial Public Offering (the "IPO"). EndoChoice filed a Registration Statement with 
the SEC, effective June 4, 2015, and filed a Prospectus with the SEC on June 5,2015, offering 
6,350,000 shares of EndoChoice common stock (collectively, the "Offering Materials"). The 
initial offering price was $15 per share. Defendants J.P. Morgan Securities, LLC, Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated, William Blair & Company, LLC, and Stifel, Nicolaus & 
Company, Incorporated served as underwriters for the lPO (collectively, "Underwriter 
Defendants"). Following the IPO, share value fell. By July 13,2016, the price of En do Choice 
stock had fallen to below the initial offering price and on September 27,2016, EndoChoice 
announced it had agreed to be bought by Boston Scientific for $8.00 per share. 
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Plaintiffs, all shareholders, filed this class action asserting that EndoChoice and nine of 
its directors and officers ("EndoChoice Defendants") along with Underwriter Defendants have 
violated Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the federal Securities Act of 1993 (the "1933 Act"). 
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants included materially false and misleading information in their 
Offering Materials about the quality and design of a new full spectrum endoscopy system (the 
"FUSE system") and the ability of its sales force to market and sell the FUSE system and 
omitted material information about the FUSE system and the sales force potential, 
In their Motions to Dismiss, Defendants argue that this Court does not have subject 
matter jurisdiction because the class action falls within an exception to concurrent jurisdiction of 
state and federal courts under the 1933 Act. Although this argument has been raised in many 
jurisdictions, this appears to be a matter of first impression for the Georgia courts. Defendants 
argue the federal pleading standard, not Georgia's, applies and that Plaintiffs have failed to state 
a claim under either standard. Each of these arguments is addressed in tum. 
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
Section 22 of the 1933 Act provides for concurrent jurisdiction over claims brought 
pursuant to the 1933 Act, "except as provided in Section 16 of this title with respect to covered 
class actions' .... " The Court recognizes that a split exists within the courts nationwide as to the 
interpretation of Section 16 of the 1933 Act, as amended, concerning concurrent jurisdiction. 
Defendants interpret Section 16 to mean that all covered class actions would be exempt from 
concurrent jurisdiction, that is, only federal courts could hear the actions. Had Congress wished 
to eliminate broadly the concurrent jurisdiction provided in Section 22 for all covered class 
I A "covered class action" seeks damages on behalf of more than 50 people, and involves a 
"covered security" which is traded nationally and listed on a regulated national exchange. See 
Section 16(t)(2) and (3); Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust. 547 U.S. 633, 637 (2006). The parties 
do not dispute this action meets the definition of a covered class action. 
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actions, it could have clearly and unmistakably said so or could have referred directly to Section 
16(t)(2) that defines covered class actions. Instead, the statute refers only to Section 16 and so 
the Court must look to the whole of Section 16 to see what, if any, exemptions from concurrent 
jurisdiction it provides. 
First, Section 16(a) states that rights and remedies are in addition to other rights and 
remedies, except as provided in section (b), which is not relevant to this case. Section 16(b) is a 
preclusion provision. It "makes some state-law claims nonactionable through the class-action 
device in federal as well as state court." Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 637 
(2006). This subsection is also inapplicable since Plaintiffs have only raised claims under 
federal law. Section 16(c) states that "[a]ny covered class action brought in any State court 
involving a covered security, as set for in subsection (b), shall be removable to the Federal 
district court ... " but no party in this case has sought removal and this case does not involve a 
covered class action of the type described in subsection (b), i.e, a class action based on state 
law? Section 16(d) provides notwithstanding (b) and (c), that certain covered class actions 
which have state law claims may be maintained in state or federal court. Section 16(e) preserves 
jurisdiction of a states' securities agency to bring enforcement actions. Section 16(t) defines 
terms, including covered class actions. Having considered Section L6 in its entirety, the Court 
finds nothing describing the case at hand or otherwise supporting an exemption from concurrent 
jurisdiction. The Court finds the reasoning of the opinion of the California Court of Appeals in 
1 Defendants have sought dismissal, not removal, of Plaintiffs' claims. This is not surprising 
given that the federal courts in the Northern District of Georgia have determined that class 
actions asserting 1933 Act claims cannot be removed to federal court, thereby acknowledging 
that state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction. See Unschuld v. Tri-S Sec. Corp., No. 
1 :06-CV -02931-JEC, 2007 WL 27229011, at * 11 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2007); Williams v. APC 
Enterps., Inc., No. 103-CV-2490-TWT, 2003 WL 24100302 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 20, 2003); Martin v. 
BeliSouth COIp., No. 1:03-CV-728, 2003 WL26476752 at *2 (N.D. Ga. July 3, 2002). 
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Luther v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 195 Cal. App. 4th 789 (2011), to be persuasive. This Court 
has subject matter jurisdiction and the Motions to Dismiss for lack thereof are DENIED. 
THE APPLICABLE PLEADING STANDARD 
Defendants argue that the federal pleading standards should apply while Plaintiffs 
contend that Georgia's notice pleading applies. "The general rule, bottomed deeply in beliefin 
the importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state 
courts as it finds them." Howlett By & Through Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990)) 
(citations omitted). "States may apply their own neutral procedural rules to federal claims, 
unless those rules are pre-empted by federal law." Id. Both parties cite Brown v. Western 
Railway, 338 U.S. 294 (1949) as support for their respective positions. In Brown, the Supreme 
Court held that the FELA claim at issue was subject to the federal pleading standards rather than 
the state standards. Defendants point to Brown as support for the federal procedural standard 
because a federal statute was involved there as it is in this case. Plaintiffs counter that in Brown 
the circumstances were the reverse of the situation here: the state pleading standard was more 
stringent than the federal standard. "Even where a claim is governed by substantive federal law, 
a state may apply its own procedural rules in its own courts, if those procedures do not defeat the 
objectives of the federa11aw." Simmons Co. v. Deutsche Fin. Servs. Corp., 243 Ga. App. 85,87 
(2000) (citing Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988)) (finding Georgia's procedural rule 
allowing a preliminary appeal from an order compelling arbitration was not preempted by the 
Federal Arbitration Act). Defendants have not cited a case in which a state court applied federal 
pleading standards in a state court for claims under the 1933 Act. The Court will apply 
Georgia's notice pleading standard to determine whether Plaintiffs have stated a claim for relief. 
"[A] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted should not be sustained unless (1) the allegations of the complaint 
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disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any 
state of provable facts asserted in support thereof, and (2) the movant establishes 
that the claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of 
the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought. .. In deciding a 
motion to dismiss, all pleadings are to be construed most favorably to the party 
who filed them, and all doubts regarding such pleadings must be resolved in the 
filing party's favor." 
Scouten v. Amerisave Mortgage COIp., 238 Ga. 72, 73 (2008) (quoting Anderson v. Flake, 267 
Ga. 498, 501 (1997)); see also O.C.G.A. §9-ll-12(b)(6). The objective of the notice pleading 
standard is to "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and a general indication of the 
type oflitigation involved; the discovery process bears the burden of filling in details." Charles 
H Wesley Educ. Found., Inc. v. State Election Bd., 282 Ga. 707, 713(1) (2007). 
STATUTORY STANDING AND TRACEABILITY 
Under Section II of the 1933Act, if a registration statement for a security contains an 
untrue statement of material fact or omits a material fact, any person acquiring such security 
pursuant to an initial public offering may sue certain involved parties. There is a presumption 
that such a purchaser relied on the misstatement or omission in the registration statement. See 
APA Excelsior III L.P. v. Premiere Techs., Inc., 476 F.3d 1261, 1271 (11th Cir. 2007). 
Likewise, under Section 12(a)(2), any person who offers or sells a security by means of a 
prospectus or oral communication which includes an untrue statement of material fact or omits a 
material fact may be liable to the purchaser of that security. Thus, the purchaser must trace its 
purchase back to the seller and the sale must have been effectuated by means of a prospectus or 
oral communication. See In reMorgan Stanley Info. Fund Sec. Litig., 592 F.3d 347, 359 (2d Cir. 
2010). 
The Complaint here makes conclusory allegations that Plaintiffs purchased the 
EndoChoice shares "pursuant and lor traceable to the defective Offering Materials" but does not 
plead the date of purchase, the purchase price, or the seller's identity. The EndoChoice 
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Defendants acknowledge in their brief that Plaintiffs' conc1usory statement as to traceability 
"might suffice under a more lenient state-law pleading standard." This Court agrees that 
traceability has been pled sufficiently under Georgia procedural standards to give Defendants 
notice of the claims against them. 
While Section 11 of the 1933 Act specifically includes underwriters, Underwriter 
Defendants here seek dismissal of the Section 12 claim against them because Plaintiffs have not 
alleged that they acquired title to the shares from Underwriter Defendants and therefore, 
Underwriter Defendants were not statutory "sellers" as defined in Section I2(a)(2). Underwriter 
Defendants acknowledge that the Complaint does allege that each of the Underwriter Defendants 
""offered and sold shares" pursuant to the defective Offering Materials. The Complaint also 
alleges that Underwriter Defendants met with potential investors to give them information about 
EndoChoice. This Court agrees with Plaintiffs that Underwriter Defendants' status as a seller 
has been pled sufficiently under Georgia procedural standards to give Underwriter Defendants 
notice of the claims against them under Section 12 as well as Section II. 
As such, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss for failure to plead adequately statutory 
standing and traceability are DENIED .. 
MISREPRESENT ATIONS AND OlVIISSIONS 
To state a claim under Sections 11 or 12 of the 1933 Act, Plaintiffs must allege that the 
Offering Materials contain an untrue statement of material fact or omit a material fact necessary 
to make the statement not misleading. "A false statement or omission is considered 'material' 
if its disclosure would alter the total mix of facts available to an investor and 'if there is a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important' to an investment 
decision." In re Sci-Atlanta, Inc. Sec. Litig., 239 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1359 (N.D. Ga. 2002), aff'd 
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sub nom. Phillips v. Sci-Atlanta, lnc., 374 F.3d 1015 (11 th Cir. 2004). "Generalized, positive 
statements about the company's competitive strengths, experienced management, and future 
prospects are not actionable because they are immaterial." Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 
854, 869 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting the company "was under no duty to cast its business in a 
pejorative, rather than a positive, light"). As to omissions, "the appropriate inquiry is whether- 
given the timely inclusion of meaningful cautionary language within 'the total mix of 
information'-the omitted fact 'is one [that] a reasonable investor would consider significant in 
the decision to invest [or divest]. ", Rubinstein v, Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 171 (5th Cir. 1994). 
First, Defendants contend that many of their allegedly misleading statements were mere 
puffery and therefore are not material as a matter of law. Puffery includes "soft" statements 
"incapable of objective verification, that courts routinely dismiss as vague statements of 
corporate optimism." In re Airgate PCS, Inc. Sec. Litig., 389 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1378 (N.D. Ga. 
2005). "General statements about reputation, integrity, and compliance with ethical norms are 
inactionable 'puffery,' meaning that they are 'too general to cause a reasonable investor to rely 
upon them.'" Strougo v. Barclays PLC, 105 F. Supp. 3d 330, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).; see also 
Rosenzweig v. Azurix COIp., 332 F.3d 854, 869 (5th Cir. 2003) ("The generalized, positive 
statements about the company's competitive strengths, experienced management, and future 
prospects are not actionable because they are immaterial."). Defendants argue statements 
describing EndoChoice as a "world class" organization, describing the FUSE system as 
"disruptive," "innovative," and "compelling," and capable of setting "a new standard of care," 
and describing the sales force as "highly adaptable," "experienced," "proven," and "poised to 
contribute to future sales growth" are mere puffery, not material, and are therefore inactionable 
under the 1933 Act as immaterial. 
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Next, Defendants argue for application of the "bespeaks caution" common law doctrine 
under which cautionary language in Offering Materials negates the materiality of the more 
optimistic "forward-looking" projections. See In re Airgate PCS, Inc. Sec. Litig., 389 F. Supp. 
2d 1360, 1366-67 (N.D. Ga. 2005); see also Saltzberg v. TM Sterling/Austin Assocs., Ltd., 45 
F.3d 399, 400 (11 th Cir. 1995) (citing In re Donald J Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357 (3d 
Cir. 1993» ("When an offering document's projections are accompanied by meaningful 
cautionary statements and specific warnings of the risks involved, that language may be 
sufficient to render the alleged omissions or misrepresentations immaterial as a matter of law."). 
Defendants rely on forty-three pages of "Risk Factors" contained in the Offering Materials, 
which disclose quality control issues with the initial FUSE system and include a statement that 
the quality assurance testing program may not detect adequately all defects. The Offering 
Materials also explain the anticipated challenges for the sales force in transitioning from selling 
less expensive equipment to selling the more expensive new FUSE system. Under the bespeaks 
caution doctrine, Defendants argue that a reasonable investor relying on the total mix of 
information provided-both optimistic forward-looking projections and disclosed risk factors- 
would not base their investment-making decision solely on the generalized expressions of 
optimism. See Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 167 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting tile "bespeaks 
caution" doctrine merely reflects the unremarkable proposition that statements must be analyzed 
in context). "Although such a defendant is under no duty to disclose every fact or assumption 
underlying a prediction, he must disclose material, firm-specific adverse facts that affect the 
validity or plausibility of that prediction." Id. at 170. 
Finally, Defendants argue certain statements in the Offering Materials are inactionable 
opinions, nor-facts, as required for claims under Sections 11 or ·12 of the 1933 Act. "A 
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statement of fact expresses certainty about a thing, whereas a statement of opinion conveys only 
an uncertain view as to that thing." Omnicare, Inc. v, Laborers Council Constr. Ind. Pension. 
Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318, 1325 (2015). "[A] sincere statement of pure opinion is not an 'untrue 
statement of material fact,' regardless whether an investor can ultimately prove the belief 
wrong." ld. at 1327. However, a party can still be liable under Section 11 for an untrue 
statement of fact which, while not stated, is necessarily assumed in an opinion statement. For 
example, the opinion stated could be a misrepresentation of the speaker's true state of mind at 
the time the statement was made. lei. Further, an opinion statement may contain an embedded 
factual misrepresentation. fd. (giving the example of an opinion statement that includes facts ("'I 
believe our TVs have the highest resolution available because we use a patented technology to 
which our competitors do not have access") includes a stated fact that the technology is 
patented). 
Additionally, a party can be liable under Section 11 if they omit facts necessary to make 
its opinion not misleading. ld. For example, "a reasonable investor may, depending on the 
circumstances, understand an opinion statement to convey facts about how the speaker has 
formed the opinion--or, otherwise put, about the speaker's basis for holding that view. And if 
the real facts are otherwise, but not provided, the opinion statement will mislead its audience." 
Id. at 1328. For example, the statement "I believe our conduct is lawful" could lead a reasonable 
investor to believe the person expressing that opinion has consulted an attorney. If the speaker 
expressed that opinion without disclosing (1) the issuer has not consulted an attorney or (2) the 
issuer actually received contrary advice from an attorney or enforcement agency, the opinion 
could be misleading based on these material omissions. ld. at 1329. However, the issuer does 
not have the burden to disclose every fact in conflict with the issuer's opinion and not every fact 
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must support the opinion. Id. at 1329. Instead, "an investor reads each statement within such a 
document, whether of fact or of opinion, in light of all its surrounding text, including hedges, 
disclaimers, and apparently conflicting information." Id. at 1330. Thus, the purchaser must 
allege a fact that was omitted and the Court must determine if "the omitted fact would have been 
material to a reasonable investor-i.e., whether 'there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
investor would consider it important. '" Id. at 1333. 
THE CLAIMS 
Turning to the Complaint, Plaintiffs identify many different statements which they claim 
are false or misleading. These statements concern three general areas: statements regarding the 
quality, design, and marketability of the FUSE system; statements regarding the quality of 
EndoChoice's sales force; and statements regarding EndoChoice's ability to generate growth in 
FUSE system sales. 
The FUSE System 
The Complaint challenges representations in the Offering Materials describing the FUSE 
system as a "quality" and "disruptive" product providing "full spectrum" viewing, "crisp, clear 
imaging and lighting," "compelling, differentiated clinical efficacy," "ease of use," and a 
"cutting edge graphics processing and computing platform." The Offering Materials state that 
EndoChoice "intend]s] to leverage ... FUSE technology to set a new standard of care of the 
global GI market" and state that EndoChoice "believe]s] that the improved clinical and cost 
outcomes that FUSE enables will lead to its widespread adoption over time." The Offering 
Materials also tout EndoChoice's ability to leverage the FUSE system to its competitive 
advantage-noting that they would build "what we believe is a world class organization capable 
of driving sustainable global growth that can be leverage to drive increased profitability" and 
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"[w]e believe the combination of a broad and innovative product portfolio spanning the entire GI 
procedure cycle coupled with our disruptive FUSE technology gives us a competitive advantage 
that will enable us to gain further share of our customers' spend." Plaintiffs allege these 
statements were "all materially false and misleading when made because, inter alia, they failed 
to disclose that, at the time of the Offering, the FUSE system suffered from a variety of 
significant product defects, reliability issues, and basic design flaws" and other ''undisclosed 
quality problems afflicting the FUSE system." The Offering Materials disclosed past problems 
with the FUSE system and noted the risk of future product issues and its impact on 
EndoChoice's operations and financial condition.' The Offering Materials' summary of 
principal risks includes that "there can be no assurance that the FUSE system will gain 
widespread adoption or that we will be successful in our efforts to commercialize our FUSE 
system." The summary also generally warns of the risk that EndoChoice "may not be able to ... 
improve or enhance existing products." The specific Risk Factor as to product quality issues and 
defects states: 
Product quality issues or product defects may harm 0111' business, results of operation 
and financial condition. 
Certain of our medical device products are highly complex and incorporate 
sophisticated technology, including hardware and software. Software contains, 
particularly in the periods subsequent to the initial launch, bugs that can 
unexpectedly interfere with the device's operation. Our quality assurance testing 
programs may not be adequate to detect all defects, which might interfere with 
customer satisfaction, reduce sales opportunities, harm our marketplace 
reputation, increase warranty repairs or reduce gross margins. In the past, we 
have had to replace certain components and provide remediation in response to 
the discovery of defects or bugs in products that we had shipped, including initial 
shipment of our Fuse® system. An inability to cure a product defect could result 
in the financial failure of products, a product recall, temporary or permanent 
withdrawal of a product from a market, damage to our reputation or our brand, 
3 The Complaint quotes only part of the Risk Factors. However, the complete Offering Materials were attached to 
EndoChoice's Answer and Defenses to the Consolidated Complaint, and therefore can be considered on a motion to 
dismiss. See Islam v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 327 Ga. App. 197, 197 (2014). 
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inventory costs or product engineering expenses, any of which could have a 
material impact on our business, results of operation and financial condition. 
However, Plaintiffs also argue the Offering Materials omitted material facts about defects 
in the FUSE system that existed at the time of the !PO and did not reveal the lack of the second 
generation FUSE systems (the "Gen2") available for demonstrative purposes by the sales force at 
the time of the IPO. Plaintiffs allege there were design, reliability, and quality problems with the 
Gen2 at the time of the lPO that were not disclosed. These defects included: poor quality 
imaging; a defective scope design that made it harder for GI physicians (especially women 
doctors) to comfortably maneuver the scope; low quality component angulation cables that 
controlled the maneuverability of the scope inside the GI tract that were constantly breaking; 
poorly designed snares (used to remove polyps) that regularly got stuck in the GI tract; defective 
imaging processors that frequently froze in the middle of an endoscopy procedure; electrical 
problems causing the lights to not turn off or emit too much heat, and defective glue that did not 
adhere. Plaintiffs also allege EndoChoice did not disclose that demonstrative units of its Gen2 
touted in the Offering Materials would not be available to sales personnel in the field until JuLy 
of2015 even though the Gen2 was "launched" in January of2015. Plaintiffs in their Complaint 
allege this omission was material because it would be difficult to sell the Gen2 without field 
demonstrations and the lack of demonstrative units made "all the more improbable that the 
Company could realize any material growth in FUSE sales until sometime in mid-to late 2016." 
The Court finds the adjectives used to describe the FUSE system to be inactionable 
puffery. To the extent the Offering Materials. predict future corporate success based on the 
FUSE system, the Risk Factors support the application of the bespeaks-caution doctrine. 
However, the Court cannot say at this stage in the litigation whether disclosures in the Offering 
Materials detailing Gen2's present day defects and unavailability for demonstration would have 
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altered the total mix of information and thus would have influenced a reasonable investor's 
decision-making. 
The Sales Force 
The Offering Materials describe EndoChoice's sales force as "proven" and "poised to 
contribute to future sales growth," its sales and marketing professionals as "experienced," and its 
sales organization as "highly adaptable." The Complaint challenges the representation that "We 
have made significant investments over the past several years in our research and development, 
sales and marketing and manufacturing operations to build what we believe is a world class 
organization capable of driving sustainable global growth that can be leveraged to drive 
increased profitabiJity." Plaintiffs contend these statements are materially misleading because at 
the time of the IPO, the sales force was not properly organized, lacked the skill and experience to 
sell more expensive medical equipment like the FUSE system, and did not have demonstrative 
units needed to accelerate growth in FUSE system sales. Plaintiffs allege the Offering Materials 
did not disclose the problems with transitioning tenured sales members to their new role nor did 
it disclose the high turnover and attrition rates within the sales force. 
The Offering Materials' summary of principal risks did include an acknowledgement tbat 
EndoChoice "may not be able to expand, manage and maintain our direct sales and marketing 
organizations" or "compete effectively in selling our GI products and services." The specific 
Risk Factors contained the following warning: 
If we are unable to expand, manage and maintain our direct sales and 
marketing organization we may not be able to generate anticipated revenue. 
As of March 31, 2015, our direct sales and marketing organizations consisted of 
103 employees, having increased from 65 employees as of December 31, 2012, 
and covered 50 sales territories in the United States. Our future success will be 
directly dependent upon the sales and marketing efforts of our employees. If our 
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sales representatives fail to adequately promote, market and sen our products; our 
sales may suffer. 
In order to generate our anticipated sales, we will need to expand the size and 
geographic scope of our direct sales organization. There is significant 
competition for qualified and experienced sales personnel. Once hired, the 
training process is lengthy because it requires significant education of new sales 
representatives to achieve the level clinical competency with our products 
expected by GJ specialists. Upon completion of the training, our sales 
representatives typically require lead time in the field to grow their network of 
accounts and achieve the productivity levels we expect them to reach in an 
individual territory. If we are unable to attract, motivate, develop and retain a 
sufficient number of qualified sales personnel, or if our sales representatives do 
not achieve the productivity levels in the time period we expect them to reach, our 
revenue will not grow at the rate we expect and our business, results of operations 
and financial condition will suffer. Also, to the extent we hire sales personnel 
from our competitors, we may be required to wait until applicable non- 
competition provisions have expired before deploying such personnel in restricted 
territories or incur costs to relocate personnel outside of such territories. In 
addition, we have been in the past and may be in the future, subject to allegations 
that these new hires have been improperly solicited, or that they have divulged to 
us proprietary or other confidential information of their former employers. Any of 
these risks may adversely affect our ability to increase sales of our products. If 
we are unable to expand our sales and marketing capabilities, we may not be able 
to effectively commercialize our products, which would adversely affect our 
business, results of operations and financial condition. 
In addition, we are in the process of transitioning our sales force from selling less 
expensive single use products to nurses and procedure room supervisors to also 
selling more complex capital equipment (such as our Fuse® system) to GT 
specialists and senior administrators. These are significant differences in these 
processes, such as a longer sales cycle, the evaluation of possible financing 
options, and more requirements for approvals in the purchasing decisions for 
more expensive capital equipment. If we are unable to increase the effectiveness 
of our sales force, our business, results of operations and financial condition may 
be adversely affected. 
However, Plaintiffs allege the Offering Materials omitted certain material facts about the 
sales force, including that the sales force was in disarray, lacked experienced personnel, suffered 
high turnover and attrition rates, was not sufficiently trained in selling more complex products 
like the FUSE system, and was given unrealistic sales quotas. EndoChoice did not disclose the 
difficulty they were having attracting and retaining new sales personnel with the necessary skills 
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and experience to sell the FUSE system. Plaintiffs claim these omissions are material because 
generally nine months were needed for a salesperson to close the sale of a FUSE system, and the 
average tenure of a sales professional at EndoChoice was less than six months. 
The Court finds that descriptive adjectives describing the sales force as "experienced," 
"proven," and "highly adaptable" are inactionable puffery. Likewise, statements that the sales 
force was a part of what made EndoChoice a "world class organization capable of driving 
sustainable global growth that can be leveraged to drive increased profitability" and that the sales 
force was "poised to contribute to future sales growth" are not actionable under the bespeaks- 
caution doctrine. The materiality of these optimistic, forward-looking statements was negated as 
a matter oflaw by the clear risk factors describing both the current challenges EndoChoice was 
facing in transitioning a sales force to sell a more expensive and complex product and to target 
the sales to more senior medical professionals. However, as noted above, whether the lack of 
functional Gen2 demonstrative units for use by the sales force was a material fact that, if 
disclosed, would have altered the total mix of information available to a reasonable investor, is 
yet to be decided. 
Anticipated Growth in FUSE Sales 
Finally, the Complaint alleges the Offering Materials contain false statements or material 
misrepresentations about EndoChoice's ability to grow and become profitable. The Offering 
Materials state: 
We expect revenue to increase in the future as we expand our sales, marketing and 
distribution capabilities to support growth in the United States and internationally as our 
FUSE system becomes more widely adopted. We expect revenues to increase during the 
remainder of2015 from 2014 levels due to the commercialization of FUSE, ~ well as a 
growing base of customers for our single-use infection control and device products and 
our pathology services. 
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The Complaint alleges these statements are materially untrue because EndoChoice failed to 
disclose the product quality and design problems and sales force issues (including lack of 
adequate supplies of demonstrative units) that would significantly undermine any reasonable 
belief that sales of the FUSE systems could or would be accelerated through the remainder of 
2015. These two sentences are forward-looking opinions. However, a reasonable investor could 
understand this opinion to be based on the existence of a market-ready FUSE system and a 
capable sales force. Plaintiffs have pointed to facts contrary to this position. Thus, it is possible 
that omissions related to the FUSE system's quality and availability and the aptitude of the sales 
force could render these opinions materially misleading. 
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss for failure to plead adequately material 
misrepresentations or omissions are DENIED. 
SO ORDERED this ~ day of May, 2017. 
on behalf of 
ELIZABETH E. LONG, SENIOR JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Business Case Division 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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